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ABSTRACT
TLS can resume previous connections via abbreviated resumption
handshakes that significantly decrease the delay and save expensive
cryptographic operations. For that, cryptographic TLS state from
previous connections is reused. TLS version 1.3 recommends to
avoid resumption handshakes, and thus the reuse of cryptographic
state, when connecting to a different hostname. In this work, we re-
assess this recommendation, as we find that sharing cryptographic
TLS state across hostnames is a common practice on the web. We
propose a TLS extension that allows the server to inform the client
about TLS state sharing with other hostnames. This information
enables the client to efficiently resume TLS sessions across host-
names. Our evaluation indicates that our TLS extension provides
huge performance gains for the web. For example, about 58.7% of
the 20.24 full TLS handshakes that are required to retrieve an aver-
age website on the web can be converted to resumed connection
establishments. This yields to a reduction of 44% of the CPU time
consumed for TLS connection establishments. Furthermore, our
TLS extension accelerates the connection establishment with an
average website by up to 30.6% for TLS 1.3. Thus, our proposal
significantly reduces the (energy) costs and the delay overhead in
the encrypted web.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Security protocols; Web protocol
security.
KEYWORDS
Transport Layer Security, Secure Socket Layer, PSK Identity, Sharing
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1 INTRODUCTION
To communicate securely, the web increasingly adopts transport en-
cryption via TLS [3]. Nowadays, more than 75% of all web requests
are protected using TLS encryption [5]. This practice benefits com-
munication security, but leads to additional performance penalties.
Most web transactions are short transfers that are significantly
delayed by the TLS connection establishment.
To accelerate the connection establishment, TLS 1.3 [12] and
its predecessors provide session resumption mechanisms. They
abbreviate the TLS handshake based on a shared secret exchanged
during a prior TLS session between the client and server. In total,
these resumption handshakes significantly reduce computational
overhead for cryptographic operations and save up to one round-
trip between client and server.
Load balancing can make it necessary to provide the content
of a hostname via different servers. To sustain the benefits of TLS
resumptions in such a setup, the respective servers can share their
secret TLS state related to the client’s connection. Furthermore,
TLS 1.3 [12] allows resumption handshakes across hostnames when
they share the same TLS certificate. Thus, the client can resume a
previous connection to hostname A with hostname B. However,
TLS 1.3 [12] recommends not to use TLS resumption across host-
names. We find that this recommendation of TLS 1.3 leads to a
significant performance limitation.
As an illustration for such a performance limitation, we assume
a website served from the hostname www.example.com. Moreover,
we assume that the hostname example.com is operated by the same
entity and provides a redirect to www.example.com. A client that
retrieves the website via the hostname example.com thus needs
to establish two TLS connections. Following the specification of
TLS 1.3, the client is required to establish both connections with
two full handshakes. However, as both hostnames are operated by
the same entity we assume that they can share their secret TLS state
with each other. Thus, a performance optimized website retrieval
requires only a full handshake to example.com and subsequently
conducts a resumption handshake to connect to www.example.com.
In this work, we propose and evaluate a TLS extension that
aims to enable the client to efficiently resume TLS connections
across hostnames. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• we introduce a TLS extension that enables the efficient use
of resumption handshakes across different hostnames.
• we simulate the loading behavior of popular websites to as-
sess the performance impact of our proposal. Our results
indicate, that our approach can convert about 58.7% of the
required full TLS handshakes to performance optimized re-
sumption handshakes upon the first visit of an average web-
site. This reduces the computational costs for the respective
TLS handshakes by about 44% and accelerates the establish-
ment of TLS 1.3 connections by up to 30.6%.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
briefly introduces TLS resumption and describes the performance
problems of TLS resumption per hostname that we aim to solve.
Section 3 summarizes the proposed TLS extension. The evaluation
results are presented in Section 4. Security and privacy consider-
ations of the proposed TLS extension are discussed in Section 5,
and related work is reviewed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
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2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we review the session resumption mechanism as
known from TLS 1.3 [12]. Then, we describe the performance prob-
lem of TLS resumption per hostname that we aim to solve.
2.1 TLS resumption
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol that
provides authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity for end-
to-end communication. It finds widespread use in applications such
as web browsing, email, and voice over IP (VoIP). The latest version
of it is TLS 1.3 [12]. It provides the option to establish an encrypted
channel with either a full or a resumed handshake. Compared to
the full handshake, the resumed handshake of TLS 1.3 provides sig-
nificant performance gains. The most time-consuming operations
in a TLS full handshake are related to the authentication of the
server’s identity [15]. These operations involve the computation of
a signature with the server’s private key. Additionally, they require
the client to verify the server’s certificate, which includes to check
the full certificate chain and to verify the server’s signature with
the public key contained in the presented certificate.
Resumed handshakes reuse the cryptographic state of a previous
connection between two communication partners. In the resump-
tion handshake, the communication partners authenticate each
other by their ability to reuse the cryptographic state of a previous
connection. As a result, resumption handshakes skip the compu-
tationally expensive public-key cryptography to authenticate the
server’s identity. Besides a lower computational overhead for re-
sumed connections, TLS 1.3 provides also a resumed handshake
that requires one round-trip time (RTT) less than the full handshake
to establish the encrypted channel. As a drawback, these resumed
TLS 1.3 handshakes impact the client’s privacy as the shared secret
can be used as a tracking mechanism [14]. Furthermore, the re-
sumed 0-RTT handshake does not protect the server’s applications
against replay attacks, which TLS itself guards against for other
handshake modes. For a comprehensive description of this reduced
security guarantees of the 0-RTT resumed handshake and more
details on TLS 1.3, we refer readers to RFC 8446 [12].
2.2 The limitation of TLS resumption per SNI
According to the specification of TLS 1.3 [12], a resumption hand-
shake should only be used when the hostname of the server, also
known as server name indication (SNI), matches the server’s host-
name of the original TLS session. Because of this recommendation
of TLS 1.3, the use of resumption handshakes is practically restricted
to revisits to servers with the same SNI. This approach provides
only performance benefits during the first visit of a website if it is
required to establish multiple TLS connections to the same SNI.
However, we find that the web has a complex structure where
accessing a web page requires an average of 19 TCP connections
to several hosts [5]. Assuming that all of these connections are
TLS encrypted, this results in 19 TLS full handshakes for the first
visit of an average website. TLS resumption across hostnames can
potentially further reduce this large number of TLS full handshakes
to realize performance improvements.
Only with respect to network latency, these TLS full handshakes
can cause a significant latency overhead x during web page loading
compared to the use of resumed 0-RTT handshakes. Note, that each
resumed 0-RTT handshake saves one round-trip time compared to
the full handshake. For the 19 connections of the average website,
this reduced latency overhead can sum up to 19 RTTs when all
connections are established sequentially. The lower boundary of
the reduced latency overhead is one RTT if all 19 connections are
established in parallel. Equation 1 shows these boundaries of the
latency overhead x.
RTT ≤ x ≤
19∑
i=0
RTTi (1)
The average round-trip time for mobile LTE connection in the U.S.
is approx. 60ms to reach popular online services [8]. Thus, for
the considered average web page the induced latency overhead by
these initial handshakes can reach up to 1.14 s for LTE connections.
Note, that the round-trip time for 3G and WiFi connections are on
average longer than for LTE connections, with a latency of 212 ms
and 151 ms respectively [7]. Therefore, these connections types
experience an even longer latency overhead for the same web page.
However, the use of resumed handshakes also significantly re-
duces the latency overhead with respect to the CPU time. Mea-
surements of the CPU time for TLS 1.2 [6] indicate that a resumed
handshake requires only 0.3 ms compared to a full handshake with
6.9 ms. Thus, based on this measurement the computational effort
of a full handshake seem to be 23 times higher than for a resumed
handshake. With respect to the latency overhead, each resumed
connection saves about 6.6 ms in CPU time on the sampled test
setup. For the average website, this leads to savings in the page
loading time between 6.6 ms for parallel connections and 125.4 ms
for 19 sequential connections.
In total, the above paragraphs highlight that the latency over-
head of loading web pages can be significantly reduced if TLS full
handshakes are replaced with resumed handshakes. However, the
restriction of TLS 1.3 to use resumption handshakes only for revisits
to the same SNI provides a practical barrier to increase the number
of resumed handshakes during the first visit of a website. For exam-
ple, a redirect from https://example.com to https://www.example.com
requires two TLS full handshakes because these are two different
SNIs. Similar, if https://www.example.com includes resources from
https://static.example.com the loading of the website requires two in-
dependent TLS full handshakes. This policy of TLS 1.3 is appropriate
if it is intended that a TLS resumption handshake between the dif-
ferent SNIs example.com, www.example.com, and static.example.com
should not be possible. For example, if www.example.com, and
static.example.com are operated by different entities that do not trust
each other. However, if www.example.com, and static.example.com
are operated by the same entity or by entities that trust each other,
then resumption handshakes between these SNIs should be possi-
ble. Hence, this approach would use resumption handshakes with
SNIs, that have not been visited previously. As a result, the latency
overhead from loading a website that includes resources from many
SNIs for the first time can be significantly decreased by this ap-
proach, when some of these SNIs have a trust relationship between
each other.
Note, that the specification of TLS 1.3 [12] appreciates that per-
formance optimizations are feasible if clients resume to servers
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with different hostnames. However, it does not provide an approxi-
mation of these performance gains nor does it describe means to
implement the exploitation of these performance optimizations.
3 TLS RESUMPTION ACROSS HOSTNAMES
In this section, we propose a TLS extension that guides the use of
TLS resumption across different hostnames, i.e., it allows to inform
clients that a TLS connection with SNI A can also be resumed
with SNI B. This information can be forwarded during the TLS
handshake via our proposed TLS extension with the type resump-
tion_across_sni.
Clients that support the TLS extension can indicate this within
their ClientHello message. For this purpose, they include the ap-
propriate extension type with an empty data field to their message.
Servers must only send the resumption_across_sni extension to
clients who signaled their support for it within their ClientHello. In
this case, the server sends a list of SNIs that support the resumption
based on the TLS state of the original session. This list of SNIs is sent
within the data field of the resumption_across_sni extension, which
in turn is sent as extension data for the servers certificate but is not
part of the certificate itself. Note, that this part of the server’s re-
sponse uses transport encryption to protect against network-based
attackers.
Upon receiving the server’s response, the client must verify
that each SNI provided within the resumption_across_sni exten-
sion is also contained in the server certificate. The specification of
TLS 1.3 [12] instructs that a client can only resume a session with a
new SNI B, if the server certificate presented in the original session
with SNI A is valid for SNI B. Thus, the client should only use the
session resumption mechanism with SNIs that can be authenticated
by the private key of the server’s TLS certificate.
To establish a connection to one of these SNIs, the client can di-
rectly use a resumption handshake for which it utilizes the state of
the original session. To support the proposed TLS extension on the
server-side, the involved SNIs are required to share cryptographic
state among each other. For TLS 1.3 this depends on the construc-
tion approach of the pre-shared keys that are used to conduct the
resumption of a prior session. The encrypted TLS connection state
either directly contains a pre-shared key or the connection state
contains a database lookup that refers to the pre-shared key in a
database instead. In the direct case, the involved SNIs need to share
a secret key that enables them to retrieve the secret server-side
connection state from the pre-shared key provided by the client. In
the database case, the different SNIs need to share their access to a
common database containing their secret server-side connection
states.
Note, that the proposed TLS extension can be used in combina-
tion with TLS version 1.2 and lower. Compared to TLS 1.3, these
older TLS versions do not apply the concept of encrypted exten-
sions. Hence, the server’s response has to be transmitted in the
unencrypted list of extensions within the respective ServerHello
message.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate the real-world impact of our proposed
TLS extension. For that, we first study the delay overhead of differ-
ent TLS handshakes to substantiate the performance benefits of TLS
resumption. Subsequently, we investigate real-world websites and
the number of sequential TLS connections required to load them
as well as existing trust relationships in between hostnames within
the respective domain trees. Finally, we simulate the performance
impact of our proposed TLS extension on the page loading behavior
of the investigated websites.
4.1 Delay overhead of TLS connection
establishment
In this section, we study the delay overhead and the CPU time of
different TLS handshake modes. The delay overhead is the addi-
tional time experienced by a user if a full TLS handshake instead
of a resumed handshake is used. The CPU time reflects more an
economic and environmental perspective, as a CPU is capable to
resume more connections than conducting full TLS handshakes
within the same time frame.
4.1.1 Evaluation setup. For the experiment, we compare the re-
quired time to download a small web page from a single host using
standard TCP together with different TLS handshake versions to
establish the encrypted channel. The tested TLS handshakes are
full TLS 1.2, TLS 1.2 resumption via session identifier, full TLS 1.3,
1-RTT TLS 1.3 resumption, and 0-RTT TLS 1.3 resumption.
We use two virtual machines, one acting as web server and
the other one as client. The virtualization is realized on the same
host using qemu 2.8 and libvirt 3.0.0. This test setup leads to short
network latencies with an average ping of 0.3 milliseconds (ms)
between the virtual machines. The host machine was equipped with
an Intel Xeon E5-1660 v4 CPU with 32GB of RAM and runs Debian
stretch. The client and server virtual machineswere both set upwith
4 GB of RAM and were running an Ubuntu 18.10, respectively. The
server ran the example server program shipped with the wolfSSL
library [11]. After successfully establishing a TLS connection, this
program responds with a short string to the client’s request. The
client ran the corresponding example client program of wolfSSL
that establishes a TLS session to the server, issues a request and
waits for the server’s response before it terminates the TLS session.
For TLS 1.3we used the forward-secure cipher suite TLS_AES_128-
_GCM_SHA256. As this particular cipher suite is not available in
TLS 1.2, we used the most similar forward-secure cipher suite
ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256. To account for skews in the
measurements, we repeated the experiment 1000 times and mea-
sured the elapsed wall-clock time. We conducted our measurements
with the client’s network interface configured to simulate network
latencies of 0.3 ms, 50 ms, 100 ms, and 150 ms with iproute2’s tc pro-
gram. We recorded and inspected the network traffic of the virtual
network interface to validate a correct behavior of our evaluation
setup.
4.1.2 Measuring the elapsed time. The delay overhead measure-
ments are summarized in Table 1. We find that independent of the
tested TLS version and network latency the resumed connection es-
tablishment saves at least 22.6 ms compared to the full handshakes.
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Table 1: Mean duration to establish a TLS connection via different handshake modes between the client-server pair and to
conduct a short data transfer.
Network TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3
latency Full Resumed Full 1-RTT resumed 0-RTT resumed
≈0.3 ms 26.66 ms 2.69 ms 29.17 ms 6.34 ms 6.57 ms
50 ms 237.86 ms 154.20 ms 190.06 ms 160.12 ms 109.61 ms
100 ms 439.08 ms 304.50 ms 340.81 ms 310.27 ms 209.72 ms
150 ms 639.15 ms 454.621 ms 490.87 ms 460.26 ms 309.44 ms
For TLS 1.2 and a latency of approximately 0.3 ms this reduces the
overhead of the connection establishment by a factor of almost
ten. The absolute reduction of the delay overhead between the
full handshake and resumed connection establishment increases
with an increasing network latency, except for the TLS 1.3 1-RTT
resumed handshake. This behavior can be attributed to the saved
round-trip times from resumed TLS 1.2 and resumed TLS 1.3 0-RTT
handshakes compared to the corresponding full handshake. We
observe, that a TLS 1.2 full handshake requires one RTT delay to es-
tablish the transport connection, another two RTTs to establish the
encrypted channel, before the last RTT requests and retrieves the
small web page. As expected, the TLS 1.3 full handshake abbreviates
this TLS connection establishment by a single RTT.
Considering the number of required round-trips times for each
measurement, we find that the duration of the connection estab-
lishment is shorter for a network latency of approximately 0.3 ms
than for higher network latencies. For example, the full TLS 1.3
handshake has a delay overhead of one RTT for the TCP connection,
one RTT to establish the encrypted channel, and another RTT to
request and retrieve the small web page. Thus, the delay overhead
of the data transfer is about 0.9 ms for a network latency of approx-
imately 0.3 ms and 150 ms for a latency of 50 ms. Subtracting this
delay overhead from the respective results of Table 1, leads to a gap
of about 10 ms as shown in Equation 2.
190.06ms − 150ms − 29.17ms − 0.9ms = 9.99ms (2)
We assume that this time gap is caused by parallel operations of both
peers that occur when the latency in between them is smaller than
the time required to compute the necessary cryptographic opera-
tions. Thus, with higher latencies peers will sequentially compute
operations during connection establishment, while shorter network
latencies induce overlapping times for cryptographic computations
at client and server.
We define the reduced delay by using a 1-RTT resumed hand-
shake or a 0-RTT resumed handshake instead of a full TLS 1.3
connection establishment as ∆1RTT and ∆0RTT , respectively. Based
on our measurements, we find that ∆1RTT is in an interval between
22.83 ms and 30.61 ms (see Equation 3).
22.83ms ≤ ∆1RTT ≤ 30.61ms (3)
However, for ∆0RTT such an interval depends on the round-trip
time between the client and server, as shown in Equation 4. Thus,
for larger network latencies the performance benefit of using a
0-RTT resumed handshake instead of a 1-RTT resumed connection
establishment increases.
22.3ms + RTT ≤ ∆0RTT ≤ 31.43ms + RTT (4)
For an average LTE connection in the U.S. with a network latency of
60 ms [8], we thus expect that a TLS 1.3 connection using a 0-RTT
handshake instead of a full handshake reduces the delay overhead
at least by 82.3 ms.
4.1.3 Measuring the CPU time. For this measurement, we deployed
the same test setup as described in Section 4.1.1. Furthermore, we
utilized the same example programs of the wolfSSL library [11]
to run the server and client. However, we started these programs
with the time program, which measures the CPU time that was
consumed during the execution of another program. Thus, it pro-
vides us a metric to assess the conducted computations on the
client- and server-side during the corresponding TLS connection
establishment.
Table 2 provides themean values of the CPU time for the different
TLS versions based on 10 000 TLS connection establishments each. A
full TLS handshake consumes between 7.84 ms and 9.22 ms of CPU
time per peer. A resumed TLS 1.2 handshakes requires a CPU time
between 0.76 ms and 1.33 ms. Resumed connection establishments
with TLS 1.3 require between 2.33 ms and 2.62 ms of CPU time per
peer. Note, that the measured resumed TLS 1.3 handshakes conduct
a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which establishes a forward-secure
communication channel. This forward-secrecy is not provided by
resumed TLS 1.2 handshakes, which leads to a smaller CPU time
compared to resumed TLS 1.3 connections.
In total, our results indicate that with respect to the CPU load at
least six resumed TLS 1.2 connections can be established instead
of a full TLS 1.2 handshake. For TLS 1.3, around three resumed
handshakes can be performed with the same CPU time as a full
handshake. Thus, an increased usage of resumed handshakes on
the web allows to significantly reduce the required CPU time of
TLS connection establishments. Note, that savings with respect
to the CPU time provide various benefits, like a reduced energy
consumption of the peers and reduced hardware requirements.
4.2 Investigating the loading behavior of the
Alexa Top 1K Sites
Performance improvements of the proposed TLS extension over
standard TLS resumption are possible if a visited hostname shares
its TLS state with another hostname that the client will connect
to later on. Hence, TLS resumption across hostnames can provide
performance improvements within the visit of a single website and
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Table 2: Mean CPU time to establish a TLS connection via different handshake modes between the client-server pair and to
conduct a short data transfer.
Peer TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3
Full Resumed Full 1-RTT resumed 0-RTT resumed
Server 8.02 ms 1.33 ms 7.84 ms 2.33 ms 2.62 ms
Client 8.26 ms 0.76 ms 9.22 ms 2.38 ms 2.46 ms
google.com
www.google.com
adservice.google.comwww.google.de www.gstatic.com consent.google.com ssl.gstatic.com
apis.google.com
Figure 1: Domain tree of root-domain google.com, which
holds the first rank within the Alexa Top1K Sites.
in between visits of different websites. In the following, we will
investigate the benefits of our proposal with respect to a single
visit of a website. For this purpose, we derived domain trees for
the Alexa Top 1K Sites [1]. These domain trees indicate the causal
relations between the hostnames requested during loading the
respective page. Figure 1 shows such a domain tree for the root-
domain google.com.
To generate domain trees, we analyzed results of the online ser-
vice urlscan.io. It scans websites with the Google Chrome browser in
headless mode and provides an overview of the browser’s requests
during the page loading. Furthermore, this service also reports the
origin of a new request that allows us to derive the causal sequence
of those requests. We conducted our scans of the Alexa Top 1K Sites
on the 8th of November 2018. We successfully retrieved the domain
trees for 839 websites and experienced errors for the remaining 161
domain trees, which manifests an error rate of 16.1%. Errors oc-
curred for various reasons on protocols like IP, DNS, SPDY, and TLS.
For example, due to timeouts, unreachable IP addresses, a failed
domain name resolution, and protocol errors. In the following, we
assume that the successfully collected website data is qualified to
represent the average loading behavior of the Alexa Top 1K Sites.
Based on the collected data, we find the 839 websites required
connections to 17 525 different hostnames to be loaded. About 97%
of these different hostnames supported TLS encryption. As our
evaluation focuses on the performance improvements for TLS con-
nections, we excluded the remaining 541 hostnames without sup-
port for TLS from our evaluation. On average, we observe that each
website within the Alexa Top 1K Sites requires TLS connections
to 20.24 different hostnames for its retrieval. Figure 2 shows the
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Figure 2: Share of Alexa Top 1K Sites over the number of
required full TLS handshakes to retrieve the website. Note,
that this plot is cut off at 25 full handshakes.
distribution of the required number of TLS connections to different
hostnames for the websites in our data set. We find, that 95.2% of the
investigated websites require more than a single TLS connection
for its retrieval. Furthermore, we note that 73.3% of the analyzed
websites require less than 26 full TLS handshake to load the site.
We find that 11.9% of all observed websites require eight full TLS
handshakes, which is the most common configuration. Note that
also google.com utilizes this configuration as shown in Figure 1.
Using the generated domain trees, we determine the shortest
path between the root-domain and all other hostnames within
the domain tree. The longest determined path indicates the maxi-
mum number of sequentially established TLS connections required
to load the page. For example, the domain tree of google.com re-
quires four sequential TLS connection to load the website (see
Figure 1). This longest path traverses the hostnames google.com,
www.google.com, www.gstatic.com, and apis.google.com. We use the
longest path of sequential TLS connections as metric to describe
the impact of TLS connection establishment on the website load-
ing performance. We assume that a website requires all its TLS
connections to be established before the loading of the site can be
completed. For the loading of google.com, this leads to four times
the delay overhead of a TLS full handshakes until all required TLS
connection can be established.
Figure 3 presents a distribution of the investigated websites over
the number of sequential TLS connections required loading the site.
As expected from Figure 2, we find that 4.8% of the investigated
websites require only one sequential TLS connection to retrieve the
site. 63.0% of the websites within the Alexa Top 1K Sites require
Sy et al.
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Figure 3: Share of Alexa Top 1K Sites is plotted over the num-
ber of required sequential TLS connections to load the re-
spective website.
less than five sequential TLS connections to load them, while no
website requires more than eight sequential TLS connections.
4.3 Measuring trust-relations within the
domain trees of the Alexa Top 1K Sites
To successfully conduct TLS resumption across hostnames, we
require the involved hosts to share their secret TLS state. Within
this evaluation, we define the sharing of secret TLS state between
different hostnames as a trust-relation. We use two approaches to
assess trust relations between different hostnames. First, we assume
a trust-relation exists, if a private key of a TLS certificate is valid
to authenticate both hostnames. Second, if a TLS session can be
successfully resumed across two hostnames, then we also assume a
trust-relation between two hostnames.
To identify trust relations between hostnames based on TLS
certificates, we analyze our data collection described in Section 4.2.
The results of the Alexa Top 1K Sites include the Subject Alternative
Names (SAN) stated in the respective TLS certificate. This SAN-list
indicates the hostnames that can be authenticated via the presented
certificate and thus can be used to infer trust relations.
We analyzed the SAN-lists of the 16 984 hostnames supporting
TLS that we identified during the scan of the Alexa Top 1K Sites.
For each domain tree, we grouped all hostnames that have a trust-
relation with each other. In total, we find that on average an Alexa
Top1K Site connects to 20.24 different hostnames, which form 9.49
trust groups on average. The mean size of a trust groups is 2.13 as
shown in Table 3. This result indicates that trust relations between
nodes of domain trees are a common phenomenon on the web.
However, these determined trust relations do not assure that TLS
resumption across different hostnames are feasible.
Table 3: Mean size of TLS trust groups within the domain
trees of each Alexa Top 1K Site
Results based upon
TLS certificates
Results based upon
TLS resumption
Union of both
evaluations
2.13 1.50 2.42
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Figure 4: Share of Alexa Top 1K Sites is plotted over the size
of the trust group that includes the root-domain. Note, that
this plot is cut off at a trust group size of 25.
To further substantiate the feasibility of our proposal, we at-
tempted to resume TLS sessions between all nodes of each domain
tree. We conducted this measurement on the 25th of January 2019
using the OpenSSL library version 1.1.0f [9] to establish a TLS
connection to each node of a respective domain tree. For this mea-
surement, we used the resumption mechanisms session ID’s and
session tickets to resume a connection via TLS versions 1.0, 1.1,
and 1.2. We observed that with an exception of 54 hostnames all
other hostnames preferred connections via TLS 1.2. Furthermore,
our results indicate session tickets are the preferred resumption
mechanism for 81.2% of the hostnames.
For this experiment, we assume that websites supporting the lat-
est TLS version 1.3 will also support one of the earlier TLS versions.
Subsequently, we attempted to resume each initial connection to
the domain at each of the other hostnames within the domain trees.
This approach provided us with a list of trust relations for each node
of a domain tree. We evaluated these lists similar to the SAN-lists
to determine trust relations within each domain tree of the Alexa
Top 1K Sites.
Based upon this measurement, we find that each Alexa Top 1K
Site has on average 13.51 trust groups. As shown in Table 3, the
mean size of these trust groups is 1.50. We observe, that the size
of trust groups differ between our conducted investigations. This
indicates that some trust relations identified via TLS certificates do
not enable the resumption of TLS session across the corresponding
hostnames. Subsequently, we study these both sets of trust-relation
by computing their union. We notice that also a significant share
of trust relations determined via successful TLS resumptions is
uncovered by the trust relations identified via TLS certificates. Con-
sidering the trust relations of both sets, we find a mean size of the
trust groups per Alexa Top 1K Site of 2.42.
Figure 4 provides additional insights into the distribution of the
group size. It plots the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites in dependence
of the size of trust groups including the root-domain. We find,
that 77.12% of the root-domains have a trust-relation to another
hostname within their domain tree. Furthermore, 90.94% of the root-
domains have a trust-relation to less than eleven hostnames within
their domain tree. Popular configurations have one or two trust
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relations for the root-domain, which represent 19.66% and 17.04%
of the Alexa Top 1K Sites respectively. Furthermore, we observe
that 40 websites within the Alexa Top 1K Sites are served via their
root-domain and do not require an additional TLS connection to a
subdomain for their retrieval.
4.4 Simulating TLS resumption across
hostnames
In this section, we study the real-world impact of TLS resumption
across hostnames. For this purpose, we conduct a simulation based
on the loading behavior of the Alexa Top 1K Sites (see Section 4.2)
and the measured trust relations within their domain trees (see
Section 4.3). We start by investigating the performance impact
of our proposal when loading a single website. Subsequently, we
extend this scenario by analyzing the visits to different websites.
4.4.1 Visiting a single website. Our proposal is capable to signifi-
cantly accelerate the first visit of an average website. To substantiate
this claim, we provide simulation results for the Alexa Top 1K Sites
in this section.
Our simulation assumes the domain trees and trust groups as
described in Section 4.2 and 4.3. Furthermore, we assume that a
full TLS handshake to any member of a trust group enables us to
subsequently establish resumed connections to all other hostnames
within the same trust group. In the real world that might not be
always the case, as multiple TLS connections might be established
in parallel, resulting in more full handshakes.
Using the proposed TLS extension, we can reduce the number
of required full handshakes to download a website by 58.75% on
average. Absolute numbers are provided in Table 4 and indicate that
our approach converts on average 11.89 full to resumed handshakes.
Furthermore, Table 4 indicates that the traditional TLS resumption
mechanism cannot reduce the number of full handshakes to dif-
ferent hostnames. However, the traditional TLS resumption is still
beneficial when multiple TLS connections to the same hostname
are required for loading the website.
Assuming that each resumed TLS connection saves approxi-
mately 6 ms of CPU time of each peer (see Table 2), then our pro-
posal reduces the required CPU time to load a website on average
by 71.34 ms. Assuming a full handshake to require 8 ms of CPU
time per peer, then our proposal saves 44.06% of the CPU time to
load an average website initially.
Table 4: Mean number of required full TLS handshakes to
different hostnames to download a website of the Alexa
Top 1K list for the first time. Note, that within this simula-
tion trust relations between hostnames are assumed based
on the union of presented TLS certificates and practical TLS
resumptions.
Without TLS
resumption
With TLS
resumption
With TLS resumption
across hostnames
20.24 20.24 8.35
Figure 5 shows the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites in dependence on
the number of required full TLS handshakes to retrieve the website.
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Figure 5: This plot shows the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites
over the number of required full TLS handshakes to retrieve
the website. The blue circles mark the values considering
TLS resumption across hostnames, while the green squares
plot the current default (see Figure 2). Note, that this plot is
cut off at 25 full handshakes.
The results of our simulation are shown as blue circles and the
default website loading behavior is marked with green squares (see
Figure 2). We find that the share of websites that require less full
handshakes significantly increased when TLS resumption across
hostnames is used. For example, the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites
requiring only one full TLS handshake is 12.87% when using TLS
resumption across hostnames and 4.76% without considering our
proposal. In total, the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites that require less
than five full handshakes is now 42.07% compared to 14.09% with-
out our TLS extension. Furthermore, 95.95% of the Alexa Top 1K
Sites require less than 26 full TLS handshakes following our ap-
proach compared to 73.3% of these websites without enabling TLS
resumption across hostnames.
In the following, we investigate the number of required sequen-
tial TLS full handshakes to retrieve an average Alexa Top 1K Site.
As shown in Table 5, the longest path of full TLS handshakes within
the domain tree of an average Alexa Top 1K Site is 4.04, indepen-
dently of the support for traditional TLS resumption. Our proposal
significantly reduced the number of TLS full handshakes required
to retrieve an average website. The longest path of full TLS hand-
shakes decreased to 2.46. Thus, to establish all TLS connections
required to retrieve a website on average requires only 2.46 full TLS
handshakes and 1.58 resumed handshake instead of 4.04 full hand-
shakes. Equation 5 allows the computation of ∆connect , which we
define as the reduced delay until all TLS connections of an average
website are established using TLS resumption across hostnames
instead of the current default website loading.
∆connect =
{
1.58 ∗ ∆1RTT for 1-RTT resumptions
1.58 ∗ ∆0RTT for 0-RTT resumptions
(5)
With respect to relative numbers, we achieve the most signif-
icant improvement for short network latencies. To establish all
connections for an average website via full TLS 1.3 handshakes
requires 4.04 ∗ 29.17 ms = 117.85 ms for a network latency of
approximately 0.3 ms. TLS resumption across hostnames allows
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Figure 6: This plot shows the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites
over the number of required sequential TLS connections to
load the respective website. The blue circles represent the
values considering TLS resumption across hostnames, while
the green squares plot the current default (see Figure 3).
to save 1.58 ∗ 22.83 ms = 36.07 ms in this scenario, leading to a
performance gain of 30.6% until all connections are established.
Table 5: Mean length of the longest path of required full TLS
handshakes to different hostnames to retrieve an average
website of the Alexa Top 1K list for the first time.
Without TLS
resumption
With TLS
resumption
With TLS resumption
across hostnames
4.04 4.04 2.46
Figure 6 provides additional insights on the number of required
sequential TLS full handshakes to retrieve an average Alexa Top 1K
Site. Comparing our simulation results plotted as blue circles to
the default website loading behavior represented as green squares
(see Figure 3), we find that TLS resumption across hostnames sig-
nificantly reduces the number of sequential TLS full handshakes.
For example, the number of Alexa Top 1K Sites require less than
three sequential TLS full handshakes for their retrieval has approx-
imately quadrupled by using TLS resumption across hostnames.
Furthermore, the share of Alexa Top 1K Sites that require more
than five sequential full TLS handshakes decreased from 36.95% to
2.26%.
4.4.2 Visiting different websites. TLS resumptions are not just fea-
sible within the context of a single website. For example, if different
websites require connections to the same hostname, then a sequen-
tial visit to these websites makes TLS resumptions feasible. In this
section, we deploy the same assumptions as in Section 4.4.1 to study
visits to different websites. However, we consider only trust rela-
tions from the TLS certificates for the simulation as an experimental
resumption test between all 16 984 hostnames present in the Alexa
Top 1K sites would result in almost 290 million connection attempts
to a rather small group of servers.
In our test scenario, we measure the average of the required
number of full handshakes to different hostnames, when visiting
different websites within the Alexa Top list. Table 6 summarizes
these results for the Alexa Top 100 and the Alexa Top 1K Sites. We
find, that the traditional TLS resumption converts about 2.5% of the
full handshakes to resumed connection establishments in the Alexa
Top 100 test scenario. In the same scenario, our proposed approach
converts 64.2% of the full handshakes to resumed connection. In
the larger Alexa Top 1K simulation, we find that traditional TLS
resumption allows to reduce the number of full TLS handshakes by
4.1%, while our approach reduces this number by 55.5% less full TLS
handshakes at the same time. These results substantiate, that TLS
resumption across hostnames significantly improves performance
for the encrypted web.
Summary. In summary, our results indicate that resumed hand-
shakes have a significantly reduced delay and computational over-
head compared to full TLS handshakes. Moreover, we find that the
loading of an average website requires more than 20 TLS connec-
tions to separate hostnames, which tend to have a trust relation
with each other. To reduce the overhead caused by the TLS connec-
tion establishment, TLS resumption across hostnames provides an
efficient mechanisms. Thus, the average website can be retrieved
with 44.06% less CPU time consumed. Furthermore, the establish-
ment of the required connections to retrieve the website can be
accelerate with up to 30.6% based on our TLS 1.3 test measurements.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the security and privacy impact of the
proposed TLS extension. Subsequently, we review developments on
the Internet that may affect the impact and benefit of our proposal.
5.1 Security considerations
The authentication of the server’s identity is a critical part of the
TLS handshake. In the full TLS handshake, the client validates the
server’s identity based on public-key cryptography. Thus, the server
is required to present a valid certificate containing a public key
that confirms the claimed identity. Furthermore, the client validates
that the server can generate a fresh signature with the private key
corresponding to the presented certificate/public key.
Within a resumed TLS handshake, these computationally expen-
sive public-key operations are omitted. The server is authenticated
by its knowledge of a cryptographic secret related to the original
TLS session, which allows the server to decrypt parts of the resump-
tion handshake. This practice presents an indirect authentication
of the server’s identity because the client does not validate the
server’s certificate and the server’s possession of the correspond-
ing private key within the resumed TLS session. Thus, resumption
handshakes require the client to trust the correctness of the server
authentication during the original session.
In the scenario of TLS resumption across hostnames, the risk
arises that an attacker exploits this weaker validation of the server’s
identity during the resumption handshake for impersonification
attacks. For example, the client connects with a full TLS handshake
to a legitimate but malicious SNI. The corresponding malicious
server then advertises session resumption to an illegitimate SNI
that would not withstand a validation of its identity by the client
during a full TLS handshake. By using a resumption handshake to
connect to this illegitimate SNI, the client may successfully establish
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Table 6: Mean number of required full TLS handshakes to different hostnames to download two websites of a given Alexa Top
list. Note, that within this simulation trust relations between hostnames are assumed based on the presented TLS certificates.
Alexa Top list Without TLS resumption With TLS resumption With TLS resumptionacross hostnames
Alexa Top 100 25.98 25.34 9.30
Alexa Top 1K 41.78 40.04 18.58
a TLS connection without noticing the insufficient authentication
of the server’s identity.
To avoid such attacks, resumption handshakes need to be re-
stricted to SNI values that are valid with respect to the server cer-
tificate presented in the original session. Note, that this restriction
is already a requirement in the specification of TLS 1.3 [12].
5.2 Privacy considerations
Session resumption mechanisms in TLS 1.3 allow tracking a user
across several visits to the same hostname [14]. TLS 1.3 uses unique
pre-shared key (PSK) identities for session resumption that can be
linked to a specific user. Thus, every time a user presents a cached
PSK identity during a connection attempt, this new connection can
be linked to the original connection where that unique PSK was
issued by the server to the client. By enabling session resumption
across several hostnames, the operators of these hostnames can
link user visits to any of these hostnames. For that, the operators of
the contacted hostnames need to share logs with each other. These
logs contain an entry on the freshly issued PSKs to a user, details on
the user activities, and if applicable information on the presented
PSK by the client during the resumption handshake. Thus, by using
the currently available session resumption mechanisms of TLS and
when extending this across hostnames the problem of illegitimate
user tracking across hostnames is facilitated.
User tracking across hostnames is a long established privacy
problem on the Internet [2]. Assuming that two different websites
want to track a specific user, e.g., via HTTP cookies or via TLS
session resumption mechanisms, they can use a simple web link
with a unique URL. If the user follows that link, then the operators
of the hostnames associate the user in their logs with the observed
web link. By sharing their logs and matching the included web links
the operators can extract the user behavior across the respective
hostnames. This example indicates that simple web links are suffi-
cient to enable user tracking across hostnames and our proposed
approach does not introduce completely new privacy problems for
the user.
The average performance of TLS connection establishments de-
pends on the ratio of resumed handshakes per full handshakes.
The higher this ratio is, the lower is the overhead of the TLS con-
nection establishment. The lifetime of the TLS session resumption
mechanisms impacts this performance for a given browsing session,
because a shorter lifetime leads to less resumed handshakes per full
handshakes. Furthermore, this lifetime presents an upper bound
for the feasible tracking period by the session resumption mecha-
nism [14]. By using resumption handshakes across hostnames, we
yield the same ratio of resumed handshakes per full handshakes
within a shorter lifetime of the session resumption mechanism.
For example, we consider a website that requires TLS connections
to two hostnames that support session resumption between each
other. By using our approach, we can directly retrieve the website
with a full and a resumed TLS connection leading to a ratio of one.
Without the usage of resumption handshakes across hostnames, it
requires two retrievals of the same website to yield the same ratio
of a resumed handshake per full handshake. Thus, our approach
allows setting the lifetime of the session resumption mechanism
to a single website visit to achieve the same performance as the
two website retrievals following the current practice of session
resumption. A short lifetime of the resumption mechanism restricts
the feasible tracking periods and therefore our approach can lead
to improvements for the user’s privacy without impacting the per-
formance of the TLS connection establishment.
5.3 Chances and limitations
In this section, we review the growing TLS adoption on the web
as this development positively contributes to the real-world im-
pact of our proposed TLS extension. Subsequently, we investigate
the adoption of TLS 1.3 0-RTT resumption handshake by popular
websites. This handshake mode does not inherently protect against
replay attacks, which restricts its use cases compared to 1-RTT
resumption handshake. If the 0-RTT handshake mode exhibits a
lower adoption compared to the 1-RTT resumption mode, then this
practice limits the feasible performance optimizations of TLS 1.3
resumption handshakes across hostnames.
5.3.1 Growing TLS adoption on the web. The adoption of TLS has
significantly increased during the last years [3]. To substantiate
this statement, Figure 7 shows of the share of encrypted HTTPS
requests over a three years’ time series. This data is collected by
regularly retrievingwebsites using desktop (dashed line) andmobile
(dotted line) browsing environments. For further details on the
methodology of these web scans, we refer the reader to [5].
As shown in Figure 7, the share of HTTPS request on the web
increased by more than 50% during the plotted period. Research
work [3] expects even further growth of the TLS deployment on
the web. Prior research[14] on TLS session resumption indicates
that about 96% of the websites supporting TLS do also support a
session resumption mechanism. Thus, we expect that the increased
deployment of TLS on the web will raise the absolute number of
hostnames that support session resumption.
5.3.2 Measuring the adoption of TLS 1.3 handshake modes. Besides
the full handshake mode, TLS 1.3 provides the option to support
1-RTT and 0-RTT resumption handshakes. We collected data on
the Alexa Top Million Sites [1] to investigate the adopation of the
different TLS 1.3 handshake modes. We scanned these websites on
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Figure 7: Percent of all requests indicating TLS support is
plotted over a time series from January 2016 to December
2018.
Table 7: Websites with TLS 1.3-support in Alexa Top lists.
Additionally the support of the 1-RTT and 0-RTT session
resumption (SR) handshake is indicated.
Alexa Top lists Share of websites supporting TLS 1.3
Full mode 1-RTT SR 0-RTT SR
Alexa Top 10 10.0% 10.0% 0.00%
Alexa Top 100 9.0% 8.0% 0.00%
Alexa Top 1K 12.7% 11.6% 0.90%
Alexa Top 10K 13.1% 12.6% 0.44%
Alexa Top 100K 9.2% 8.9% 0.19%
Alexa Top 1M 8.1% 7.1% 0.05%
January 25, 2019 using the library boringssl [10]. For that, we first
established a TLS 1.3 connection via a full TLS handshake. If this
connection establishment succeeded, then we directly tried to es-
tablish connections via 1-RTT and 0-RTT resumption handshakes.
Table 7 summarizes our findings. 80 799 websites within the
Alexa Top Million list support the TLS 1.3 full handshake. 87.6% of
these websites also support session resumption via 1-RTT hand-
shakes. However, within the Alexa Top 100K this share reaches
96.9%. Thus, our results indicate widespread support for session
resumption by websites supporting TLS 1.3. Furthermore, our re-
sults indicate that 491 websites among the Alexa Top Million list
support the 0-RTT handshake mode. This represents a share of
0.6% of the respective websites within the Alexa Top Million list
that support TLS 1.3. However, within the Alexa Top 1K this share
raises to 7.1% with nine websites out of 127 websites supporting
TLS 1.3. Overall, the support of 0-RTT handshakes is within our
sample lists, at least one magnitude lower compared to the support
of 1-RTT resumption handshakes.
In total, we find our measurement investigates an early stage
of the deployment of TLS 1.3 on the web. At the time of our scan,
still many server vendors and CDNs did not support TLS 1.3 [4].
Furthermore, some server vendors and CDNs do support TLS 1.3
except for TLS 1.3 0-RTT resumption handshakes [4]. We expect
that the number of websites supporting TLS 1.3 and their resump-
tion handshakes will raise during the next years as more server
vendors and CDNs will support this new TLS version by default.
We assume that the lower deployment of TLS 1.3 0-RTT resump-
tion handshakes is also caused by the lower security guarantees
compared to the 1-RTT resumption case. Thus, we expect this hand-
shake mode will remain less widely adopted compared to the 1-RTT
handshake mode.
6 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the
performance benefit of TLS resumption across hostnames. However,
prior work [13, 14] did already report the sharing of TLS state across
hostnames, which is a pre-requisite for resuming a TLS session with
another hostname.
Furthermore, also RFC 8446 [12] briefly discusses the oppor-
tunity of performance enhancements based on TLS resumption
across hostnames. This RFC concludes that TLS resumption across
hostnames is possible within certain security limitations that lead
to a high failure rate for resumption attempts. However, this RFC
did not consider the option of a TLS extension to inform the client
about other hostnames that are capable to resume the respective
session. We argue that our proposed TLS extension minimizes this
failure rate, as the client will only attempt a resumption handshake
with hostnames directly recommended by the server during the
original TLS session.
7 CONCLUSIONS
A TLS extension supporting clients to conduct TLS resumption
across hostnames is overdue. Our evaluations indicate, that the
proposed TLS extension yields great performance optimizations for
clients and servers on the existing web without affecting the user’s
privacy and communication security.
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